DOT&E Report On Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, Strykers Released

Inside Defense
January 17, 2012

DOT&E Report On Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, Strykers Released

The office of the Pentagon's chief weapons tester, Michael Gilmore, released a report last week with a variety of recommendations and updates concerning the Army's vehicle fleet, mostly pointing out where additional testing and design tweaking remains necessary.

When it comes to the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the Army's intended replacement for the humvee that is poised to be approved for its engineering and design manufacturing phase this month, Gilmore recommends that the Army continue to "capitalize on lessons learned from the JLTV [technology-development] testing to update the [EMD] Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability Growth Plan," and to "submit a Test and Evaluation Master Plan to support the milestone B decision."

During the TD phase, the Army changed the JLTV's protection requirement to that of a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle, something Gilmore notes could inhibit the vehicle's other requirements, such as mobility.

The Army and Marine Corps, which are partnering on the program, recently revised the JLTV's requirements with an eye toward greater affordability and a more streamlined development schedule.

Gilmore also notes JLTVs tested in the TD phase had "unique safety problems," which "limited the execution of the JLTV User Test Demo to assess ingress/egress, coupling and uncoupling of the trailer and vehicles, and performing the gunner drills."

The vehicles also showed a "lack of adequate storage space for ammunition, restricted visibility due to small windows, positioning of window panels, and
uncomfortable seats with poor seating arrangements."

Three teams have been awarded JLTV technology-demonstration contracts: one team includes Navistar Defense and BAE of York, PA; another includes Lockheed Martin and BAE Armor Holdings; and a third, involving AM General and General Dynamics, is called General Tactical Vehicles. Oshkosh Defense is expected to compete in the EMD phase as an outsider, while Ford is eying the program and Navistar is contemplating a separate solo bid.

In a separate assessment of Force Protection's Cougar ambulance, Gilmore writes that it is operationally effective, but not "operationally suitable due to its poor reliability, which contributed to its low availability." Gilmore also writes that Navistar's MRAP Recovery Vehicle, which underwent a limited user test in fiscal year 2011 as part of Navistar's overarching independent suspension system LUT, is "not operationally effective and not operationally suitable for recovery operations on cross-country terrain" because of its "poor mobility" and combat towing.

"The Navistar MRV is not reliable," Gilmore wrote. "The Navistar MRV is capable of recovering and combat towing damaged MRAP vehicles on flat improved roads."

Gilmore recommends that the MRV improve cross-country mobility, vehicle power and system reliability prior to entering full operational test and evaluation.

Gilmore also recommends that Oshkosh Defense redesign the Special Operations Forces M-ATV to "accommodate larger rear passenger windows improving visibility of SOF operators in the rear to observe their surroundings," as well as fix "firepower related failures" and improve the air flow rate within the vehicle. In its current state, the M-ATV is operationally effective for conducting tactical transport missions, but not operationally effective for conducting unique SOF combat missions, he writes.

For Oshkosh's Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, Gilmore recommends that work be done to address "heating, ventilation, and air conditioning failures and improve the reliability of Load Handling System twist lock failures," as well as to "continue exploring additional protection against current underbody and under-wheel threats."

Gilmore is also bullish on the Army's plans for competitive humvee recapitalization, known as the Medium Expanded Capacity Vehicle. In his report, he notes that "ballistic testing of early [humvee] blast mitigation system design indicates that achieving underbody protection equivalent to that provided by the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle is feasible."

Gilmore provides a positive review of the increased protection provided by the new Stryker Double-V Hull vehicle developed by General Dynamics Land Systems, and recommends only that the Army should increase space in the driver's compartment to accommodate larger soldiers.

Meanwhile, Gilmore writes that the Army should continue to work on the mobility of the Stryker Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance

Vehicle, which suffered under the additional weight of protective slat armor.

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Inside Defense
GAO: Force Protection Features Cost SAIC-Boeing In GCV Competition

Science Applications International Corp. and Boeing were excluded from the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle program last year because of concerns over their design's force-protection features, a Government Accountability Office decision reveals.

At issue is the industry team's proposal for an active protection system, aimed at destroying incoming rockets and grenades, and the design of its underbody armor, aimed at protecting a GCV's crew against improvised explosive devices. Force protection was a major factor on which offerors were judged when the Army awarded development contracts for the multibillion-dollar program last summer.

Contract awards went to BAE Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems. The SAIC-Boeing team came up empty and subsequently protested the Army's award decision. The team's principal argument held that the Army subjected its offering to a more demanding evaluation process than the other two proposals.

In a redacted protest decision issued by GAO last week, auditors explain their determination, reached in early December, that the Army held all three companies to the same standards. The 20-page opinion contains a plethora of details surrounding the case, including an assessment by the Army that officials had "concerns with all three offerors' force-protection solutions."

The sections discussing the characteristics of SAIC's proposal for an APS are heavily redacted. The bottom line in the Army's argument against the offering was that the company was unable to produce "substantiating data to support its performance claims," the GAO opinion states. Specifically, Army officials questioned that the company team would be able to improve the APS' response time so that it can defeat a specific round, the name of which was deleted from the GAO document.

The opinion addresses SAIC's claim that its offer is based on the Puma vehicle, used by the German army, and therefore should have ranked higher in the Army evaluation system. Industry team officials made the argument that a GCV based on an existing design would be less fraught with risk than a completely new vehicle design, as BAE and GDLS proposed.

Government lawyers determined that the Army had taken this argument into account, but noted the significant level of effort involved in modifying the Puma so it can fulfill the U.S. requirement of seating a nine-member squad.

The SAIC-Boeing underbelly protection design was found to constitute a "weakness," according to the GAO opinion. When asked by the Army to provide more information about it, company officials responded that the information was classified and belonged to the German ministry of defense. "SAIC . . . responded that the information the Army was seeking was set out in a proprietary, classified drawing, which SAIC was not permitted to deliver," according to the GAO opinion.

The company offered to provide details to U.S. government personnel under the condition of non-disclosure agreements, but the Army judged the design as "uncertain." While the German defense ministry offered classified briefings to the Army on the underbody protection test results and simulated models, Army officials declined because it would have required them to travel to Germany. The German stipulation also was that no notes were to be taken and no documents handed over.

Consequently, the Army's characterization of a weakness due to the lack of data was justified, according to GAO attorneys.

Additional Army concerns with the SAIC-Boeing proposal included insufficient head clearance for crew members, "seating system integration problems," a risk of toxic fumes in the crew compartment due to the "battery pack" placement, and "various hazards inhibiting egress to the rear of the GCV," according to the GAO document.

Source-selection officials gave SAIC several warnings that the company's proposal would be rejected if critical weaknesses remained after a round of proposal revisions, GAO said.

Auditors considered only the Army's actions during the evaluation process, not the substance of the service's arguments against the SAIC-Boeing proposal.

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InsideDefense.com
Keeping America Competitive: The Military Needs To Limit Its Industrial Roles

During the Cold War, the U.S. military acquired a vast network of public-sector industrial facilities and private-sector suppliers. Over time, a division of labor emerged between the two segments of the defense industrial base: private companies would develop and manufacture combat systems, while public facilities would maintain and repair them. Although this arrangement required the government to fund two parallel industrial systems, it worked reasonably well as long as the U.S. economy generated the wealth necessary to support a vast “military-industrial complex.”

However, in recent years the U.S. economy has begun to falter and the federal government’s debt has risen rapidly. That has led to a widespread belief that the government needs to reassess how its activities impact economic performance. One facet of the debate is the relationship between military spending and the nation’s industrial base. While it is indisputable that Pentagon research has led to important technological breakthroughs such as computers, jet engines, lasers and the Internet, other facets of the military enterprise may be impeding economic competitiveness and progress.

A case in point is the industrial functions performed by federal facilities such as depots and shipyards. These facilities, which typically employ thousands of workers, often provide services that could be obtained from private companies. In the process, they drive up the government’s fixed costs, contributing to budget deficits. They also fracture the product life-cycle of combat systems by requiring transfer of the systems from the private sector to the public sector, largely severing the relationship between developers and maintainers. In addition, they undercut the potential for economies of scale that have long been recognized as crucial to maximizing efficiency. Beyond that, they reduce the trade competitiveness of some of the nation’s biggest exporters while slowing the pace of innovation in the industrial segment of the economy.

This report explains why performance of industrial activities in military depots and shipyards can be detrimental to the nation’s broader economic goals. It acknowledges the contributions of public-sector facilities, but argues that the range of industrial functions they accomplish should be limited to assure they do not impede the potential of the larger economy. The report was written by Dr. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute staff as part of the institute’s continuing inquiry into the relationship between U.S. economic and security policies.


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